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THE SOLVING 
OF THE WORLD-RIDDLE 



OR 



THE RATIONAL GROUNDS 
OF THEISM 



(THE METAPHYSICS OF THE SUBJECT 
CLARIFIED, AND IN A NUTSHELL) 



HENRY C 



BY 
. MABI 



BIE, D.D., LL.D. 



Revised and reprinted from the Watchman- Examiner 



Samuel Usher 

176 HIGH STREET, BOSTON. MASS. 



/V 



OTHER BOOKS BY DR. MABIE 

In Brightest Asia. (Out of print.) 
W. G. Corthell, Boston. 

Method in Soul-Winning. 

The Meaning and Message of the Cross. 

The Divine Reason of the Cross. 

Fleming H. Revell Co., New York. 

The Divine Right of Missions. 
How Does the Death of Christ Save Us? 
The Task Worth While, or The Divine 
Philosophy of Missions. 

Griffith & Rowland Press, Philadelphia. 

Under the Redeeming Aegis. 

Hodder & Stoughton, London. 



Copyright, March, 191 5 
By Henry C. Mabie 



All rights reserved 

MAR 30 \m 

CU397352 



FOREWORD 

The writer's duties during several years have 
led him into wide and varied contact with stu- 
dents, in both the home and foreign lands. He 
has been under the necessity of discussing the 
Christian doctrine of God and the moral order, 
especially as underlying vital conceptions of Chris- 
tian Missions. 

He has, however, found among students widely, 
a lamentable lack of elementary grounding in any 
clear doctrine of the human soul, the chief basis 
for theism. This situation is in strong contrast 
to that existing a generation ago. Doubtless 
the altered emphasis is due to the larger place 
assumed since Darwin by the Physical Sciences, 
as opposed to the more abstract and metaphysical 
ideas of an earlier time. The wide prevalence, 
moreover, of elective courses in college have lured 
students to their disadvantage from the more 
difficult work. 

Great libraries indeed abound in psychological 
and philosophical works, yet they are so volumi- 
nous with historical and discursive matter that it 
is disheartening to the average undergraduate to 
attempt to compass them. Besides, Metaphysics as 
a science has within a few years undergone great 
changes, and so many works once famous have 
become out-dated. 

The need, therefore, of a simple, up-to-date 
epitome of the subject, embracing a view which 

3 



4 The Solving of the World-Riddle 

presents a minimum of difficulties, seems to be 
much needed. Such a view in the mind of the 
writer is afforded by some form of what is called 
Objective Idealism. 

If it is objected that there is no need of a reasoned 
doctrine of God, inasmuch as the whole matter is 
intuitional, I reply, even so; for the child-like 
and the simple-hearted. But those who are en- 
snared by the sophistications of Naturalism do 
need to be shown the grounds for better conclu- 
sions. Just that this little booklet tries to furnish. 

The positions herein stated make no claim to 
originality, except in the simplified form of state- 
ment. The positions themselves are substantially 
those of the late Prof. Borden P. Bowne of Boston 
University, and corroborated by kindred thinkers 
like Dr. A. H. Strong, Profs. Rudolf Eucken, 
J. W. Buckham, J. H. Snowden, and many others. 
The writer was called for a 'brief season to deal 
with the questions involved, with a class of " elec- 
tives " in Rochester Theological Seminary, at the 
earnest solicitation of President-Emeritus Augustus 
H. Strong, D.D., LL.D. The line of work proved 
so intellectually stimulating, and so assuring to 
theistic faith, that the subject has been pursued 
ever since, and especially while resident in Ger- 
many, and in further preparation to deal in later 
travels in Asia with typical forms of the Oriental 
mind. For such values as are embraced in the 
studies themselves, they are now committed to 

the public, in this form. 

HENRY C. MABIE. 

Boston, March i, 191 5. 



CONTENTS 



I. The Issue Stated 

II. The Naturalistic Theory . 

III. Berkeley's Absolute Idealism 

IV. Immanuel Kant's Idealism 

V. The Later Objective Idealism 

VI. Grounds for God's Being and Our Knowledge of 
Him ........ 

VII. Conclusion 



7 
13 
19 
23 
29 

35 
4i 




PROFESSOR ERNEST HAECKEL 



THE RATIONAL GROUNDS OF THEISM 




THE ISSUE STATED 

On an evening in August, 19 13, the writer, ac- 
companied by Professor Rudolf Eucken, was privi- 
leged to meet two other distinguished professors 
in Jena, Germany, namely, Ernest Haeckel and his 
successor as president of the German Monistic 
Society, Wilhelm Ostwald, of Leipzig. As we 
were ushered into Haeckel's library, he jocosely 
inquired, " Aren't you afraid to come into this 
den of lions? We have the reputation here of 
being dreadful infidels." 

I replied, " I have no particular sense of fear. 
I am looking for the lions of Jena, and so, under 
the protecting aegis of Professor Eucken, I am 
here." 

Then came another query, " What do you think 
of this scheme of things [meaning the universe], 
of which we are a part? " 

I answered, " Well, I am not here for controversy, 
but your question is a straight one, and it is en- 
titled to a straight answer. I reckon there is a 
Thinker behind it all." 

He responded, " Perhaps." 

I answered, "Why say 'perhaps'? That is 
certain." 

He added, " What makes you so confident? " 

7 



8 The Solving of the World-Riddle 

" Your own basis as a scientist." 

He asked, " How so? " 

I replied, " Because all science as well as phi- 
losophy or theology cannot advance at all without 
postulating certain primary truths, intuitions, or 
axioms, deeper than formal proof, in order to find 
a standing in reason from which to work out any 
system." 

And I added, " Doubtless you believe in the 
science of astronomy, among other sciences." 

" Certainly." 

" But is not astronomy mainly based on mathe- 
matical axioms or other strictly psychological 
data? " 

" Probably." 

" Are all mathematical axioms the deliverances 
of rationality? " 

" Undoubtedly." 

" And who is the real astronomer, say a Kepler 
or Copernicus, but one who has thought the process 
of the stellar universe over again on its plan? " 

(With hesitation) " Probably." 

" Then is not he who brought into being the 
astral worlds, at least a mathematician, and if so, 
a thinker? " 

To this the agnostic author of The Riddle of the 
Universe made no reply, if he had one. 

When asked if a framed picture of two mammoth 
apes hanging on the wall of the room were his 
ancestors, the real " missing links," he smilingly 
nodded assent. 

I then asked, " Whence came they? " 

" Oh," he replied, " from the egg. n 



The Solving of the World-Riddle 9 

" Indeed! But who laid the egg?" 

He changed the subject, and began to inquire 
about immortality and wondered if I believed in it. 

By this time it was Eucken's turn to come in for 
some criticism respecting his idealism. This waked 
the philosopher up, and he warmed eloquently to 
his replies. In winding up his colloquy, Eucken 
did not hesitate to intimate that these naturalists 
were very dogmatic, and that " without grounds 
either in science or philosophy," in their funda- 
mental assumptions of certainty. 

Thus in most concrete form the issue implied 
in this discussion received concrete illustration. 
Our universe is either a product of thought, or it 
is a self -wrought evolution of matter. 

Accordingly, two very widely different attempts 
on the part of thinkers to explain our universe — 
and this is all that philosophy really means — 
have contended for mastery during the past two 
hundred years. The one starts from the particle 
of matter. It assumes that every thing in the 
universe, including all that is in man — mind, 
heart, conscience, and will — and even all that is 
contained in ideas of God can be accounted for 
by the mere developments of matter. This view 
is the materialistic. True, this view as a phi- 
losophy has long been widely repudiated — even 
Haeckel in Germany being now a lone figure. 
Survivals of the theory, or implications of it, how- 
ever, still widely abound, and they work great 
havoc in thought and religion. 

The other method of world explanation starts 
with the self-conscious, personal soul, as necessarily 



io The Solving of the World-Riddle 

assumed by consciousness, incapable of proof and 
needing none. This is the idealistic view, and 
affords the intellectual basis for any real belief 
in God. Its fundamental position is that spirit 
rather than matter is first, and that everything 
in the universe, material and spiritual, has origi- 
nated in the idealizing creative mind of God — a 
mind with which our own human minds are ho- 
mogeneous. There is no such thing in the world 
as mere static " thinghood," " pure being," exist- 
ing in and of itself, apart from the Creator's 
thought (sin and wilful perversion excepted). 

The notion that the so-called ontological argument, 
on which the validity of the cosmological and the 
design arguments also depends, constituting proof, 
was long ago adjudged to be inadequate. The 
highest argument for God does not amount to a 
demonstration. It rests on the assumed existence 
of a timeless, absolute, perfect being — an assump- 
tion, however, which if lived upon affords ever- 
increasing assurance. If theistic faith thus based 
is groundless, however, all our mental life is no 
less untrustworthy. Without some assumption 
we can have no dependable theory of anything. 
We may, however, be assured that if our theism 
is by nothing absolutely proved, it is nevertheless 
implied in everything: This is because there is an 
intuitional element in us deeper than formal proof. 
Where we cannot demonstrate, we proceed upon 
the practical postulate that has the fewest diffi- 
culties. At that point we exercise faith, and we 
exercise our wills. Our deepest beliefs are forma- 
tions and experiences of our total life, rather than 



The Solving of the World-Riddle II 

mere inferences from logic, — the mere formal 
regulative faculties, — never so deep as life itself. 
Theism is the fundamental postulate of our deepest 
and most composite life. An assumption, indeed, 
underlies it, but without it we wreck all our mental 
and certainly our moral interests. Our cognitive 
and speculative faculties are so bound up with 
theism as to stand or fall with it. 

Of course both theism and atheism (politely 
termed agnosticism) are, to begin with, hypotheti- 
cal assumptions. The proof of either is only 
really worked out through subsequent tests of 
life and moral action, and such proof is ever a 
growing one in the direction where the truth lies, 
namely, in theism. 

A study of the matter involved in the two 
theories stated implies some distinctions in meta- 
physics. It is the only thorough way. But let 
us not be frightened at a mere term. All normal 
minds are metaphysical, i. e., more than physical, 
if they are rational. The important thing is, 
that the metaphysics be sound rather than unsound. 
The only way to avoid metaphysics is to become 
demented. Then let us dismiss the old libel that 
all metaphysics is " the search of a blind man in 
a dark room for a black cat that is not there." 
We grant that a process of mere intellect apart 
from moral action cannot afford experience of God, 
but it may lead the way to it. 

The most fruitful source of mischief in this whole 
realm is the assumption sometimes taken on by 
science to be a philosophy, whereas the ends served 
by these two departments of inquiry are entirely 



12 The Solving of the World-Riddle 

different, yet in no necessary conflict with each 
other. The function of science is to observe, 
register, and classify phenomena at the most as 
mere antecedents and consequents in a series. 
Philosophy goes further, and seeks for causes that 
really explain, rather than historically describe. 
Science has not one word to say respecting causes, 
— that dynamic something which is beneath the 
surface. If it assumes to do this it becomes 
neither science nor philosophy, albeit it is here 
often most dogmatic. 

It is in the hope of clarifying somewhat this 
involved matter, and because many whom I meet 
in wide circles need it and are even eager for it, 
that I have ventured to prepare this brief treatise 
particularly for the use of students. 

The positions stated and commended will be 
those of what is termed " Objective Idealism." 
In the statement no particular claim will be made 
to originality, except in the effort to simplify. 
The positions themselves are substantially those 
of many thinkers and writers like those referred 
to in the Foreword and in Chapter V. 




PROFESSOR RUDOLF EUCKEN 



II 

THE NATURALISTIC THEORY 

The main thesis of this form of world-explanation 
is that what we call spiritual process, whether in 
mental or moral action, is a mere continuation of 
rather than analogous to natural process expressed 
in the material world,* — mere material force 
working itself up to the higher level. 

This natural process is assumed to have a basis 
in existence entirely independent of spiritual dy- 
namic or form of thought-energy in the universe. 
This natural independent existence as grounded 
in molecules and atoms, and operating through 
indwelling laws, is deemed sufficient unto itself. 
It works itself by mechanical interactions. It 
is this assumption that has wrought so great 
injury to fundamental faith and religion. I note 
a few instances or applications claimed for this 
method of activity in our universe. 

First. It is assumed and frequently stated in 
the philosophy of Herbert Spencer that the main 
element in life is " the adjustment of existence 
to environment." This matter is taken up by 
Dr. John T. Gulick, of Honolulu, eminent both 
as scientist and missionary, in an article entitled 
" False Biology and Fatalism," and published in 
the Bibliotheca Sacra, April, 1908. Gulick herein 

* It was at this point that Henry Drummond probably erred in his Natural 
Law in the Spiritual World, as some of his Scottish critics pointed out, a verdict 
which Drummond later practically accepted. 

13 



14 The Solving of the World-Riddle 

opposes Spencer's denial of the freedom of the will, 
which with him rests on the biological assumption 
that all vital activities are predetermined by activi- 
ties in the environment. Gulick proceeds to show 
that changes in the so-called natural selections are 
as really and as often begun and maintained through 
changes in the vital organism as they are in part 
also affected by environment. Gulick also points 
out that while external nature may furnish the 
means or occasion, the real cause lies vastly deeper. 

It is the frequent mistake of scientists when they 
turn philosophers to mistake mere phenomenal 
antecedents for the real cause. The problem of 
life, however, involves a deep and reverent inquiry 
into the vital dynamic, placed there by the purpose 
and will of the Creator. 

A second error rooted in naturalism underlies the 
crass socialism so radically threatening the order 
and stability of fundamental institutions like the 
family, the church, the nation, and normal inter- 
national relationships. According to this theory, 
social order is founded neither in the soul of man 
nor in the being of God, but has for its uniting 
bond only the agreement of a social contract. For 
social purposes it is expedient to agree, and so 
social contract arises, whether for the State or for 
any other institution. But all is left without any 
inner controlling principle or sanction as found in 
God or man. The unity thus arising is but the sum 
of its social fragments. The sole driving power 
is individual self-assertion, its aim mere utility, 
self-interest " functioning " — a vague term now 
much in fashion. The combined selfishness backed 



The Solving of the World-Riddle 15 

by will secures the good of society. Yet, strangely, 
this system is marked and controlled by the most 
dogmatic individualism. It makes no claims to 
true personality, human or divine, or to any sanc- 
tions outside arbitrary will, or a sum of wills. It 
is psychology without a soul. Hence how enor- 
mously important that those who justly feel com- 
pelled to emphasize the social corollaries of Chris- 
tianity should carefully avoid tacit or apparent 
justification of the radical falsities of the socialistic 
propaganda as such. 

A third practical matter of vast moment as 
grounded in the naturalistic theory is the denial 
of freedom or spiritual initiative. Building on the 
idea that so-called natural process has a true inde- 
pendence, sense impressions of outward circum- 
stance alone are deemed sufficient to account for 
any kind of initiative. Freedom is thus resolved 
into a mechanical determinism, of late so much in 
fashion in certain supposedly philosophical circles. 
Now put over against this the protest of that fore- 
most physicist, Sir Oliver Lodge, when he says, 
"The universe is not a machine subject only to 
outside forces, but a living organism with initiatives 
of its own." He inveighs against " the modern 
superstition that the universe is so suffused with 
law and order that it contains nothing personal, 
nothing indeterminate," and adds, " The Creator of 
free creatures desires that men shall do right, not 
because they must, but because they will; that is 
the divine problem, and his highest problem — the 
highest problem of which we have any conception." 

A fourth matter, corollary of naturalism, is the 



1 6 The Solving of the World-Riddle 

doctrine that " might makes right" — the right to 
work out self-will by sheer force, as against the 
rights of others. This idea has an especially 
iniquitous manifestation just now in the brutal 
warfare of Europe, and in such brigandage as 
moves a strong nation to trample upon the weak. 
Whenever a nation in disdain or contempt of moral 
law and all equities in the case seizes territory by 
arrogance or force it commits this crime. When 
any monopolistic corporation goes to all lengths to 
have its own way, even assuming, as it sometimes 
does, to create a providence for others, it is equally 
without sanction in the nature either of God or man. 
Such policy invariably falls back on Darwinian evo- 
lution and its Godless doctrine, " the survival of the 
fittest," never once asking whether itself was ever 
fit to arrive; and, if not, on what grounds should 
it ever presume to survive? All corporate organi- 
zation, as really as the individual, is under moral 
law, despite Bernhardi's dictum that international 
law is a delusion. 

If the right claimed be that of autocracy, of an 
unprincipled majority or of the anarchistic mob, — 
whichever can command the power, it is all alike 
Godless and hellish. The policy of Nebuchad- 
nezzar, Nero, Tamerlane, or the devil could be 
justified and upheld on precisely the same grounds. 
The doctrine is essentially materialistic and atheistic. 
Another corollary of this naturalistic doctrine is 
that all religion is but some sort of primitive, 
atomic, self-caused process of gradual transforma- 
tion of some abstract imagined entity or other. 
This may have arisen and been developed by a 



The Solving of the World-Riddle 17 

gradual emergence from animalism, through hered- 
ity, climatic or other external conditions — anything 
so long as accountability is evaded. All religions, 
therefore, are co-ordinate, equally good, or good for 
nothing, as one's taste dictates. The idea that any 
of them — even the one embodied in Christ — is 
absolute and final, entitled to ultimate and universal 
sway, is utterly disputed. Even Eucken, who particu- 
larly among present-day writers has pointed out 
the defects and downright errors of naturalism — 
in fact, this summary of naturalistic principles 
is substantially Eucken's own — strangely and in- 
consistently contends against biblical Christianity 
being considered as " the one and only true 
religion." By the processes above outlined, nature 
as God created and viewed it is, to use Eucken's 
own language, " dehumanized, vanquished by the 
very nature which man has so brought under 
scientific control." That man is indeed first a serv- 
ant of nature, and afterwards its ruler, is, to be 
sure, a paradox; but paradoxes abound in any true 
religion. Of this whole realm — the paradoxical — 
however, a naturalistic philosophy superciliously 
takes no cognizance. Mere mental speculation, 
particularly " the natural mind," cannot entertain 
the deeper truth of an apparent contradiction 
involved in the paradox. It is only by living this 
sort of truth that its harmony is discovered; and 
the natural mind is far from the intention of living 
in the humble way necessary to the realization of 
such truth. Hence it is that mere opinion apart 
from life is empty for religion. 

It should be added that this naturalism has 



1 8 The Solving of the World-Riddle 

no theory of knowledge, no criteria for truth; in 
short, no metaphysics. It confines itself blindly 
to mere induction, but the half-process at best, 
and it ignores all deduction — that prerogative of 
basal reason — or the findings of the self-conscious 
intuitive soul; and thus it becomes philosophically 
inane. 




BISHOP GEORGE BERKELEY 



in 

BERKELEY'S ABSOLUTE IDEALISM 

The first to propound Idealism as an absolute 
system was Bishop George Berkeley, of Ireland. 
His theory was brought out in what was called 
A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human 
Knowledge, published in 1710. His object was to 
oppose the materialism and skepticism of his age. 
He argued his case on the ground that the phe- 
nomena of sense in an act of perceiving objects are 
best explained by supposing a continuous act of 
deity as imposing these objects upon the mind in a 
dramatic way, as if for our wonder and entertain- 
ment in a play. This was his notion of perception. 
In the interests of his argument he went so far as 
to deny the reality of the external world altogether; 
in his thought there is only a set of mental images. 

Berkeley was long ridiculed as an idle dreamer, 
but later opinion has accorded to him a subtlety 
of mind both penetrating and prophetic. His 
reflections have been repeatedly taken up and 
worked over, even by the most astute, philosophical 
minds, including Immanuel Kant's, and clarified 
of confusions while retaining the residuum of value. 
He made one real and important discovery, namely, 
that the objects we experience as known in our 
minds are not merely dead copies of things, photo- 
graphed on the mind as on a sensitized plate by 
sense-impression, as at first sight they appear to 
be, and as has been generally claimed by realistic 

19 



20 The Solving of the World-Riddle 

philosophers. The relation concerning the primary 
place in an experience of knowledge, as between 
the subject mind which knows and the object con- 
templated, is inverted, as opposed to that which at 
first thought appears; that is, the mind itself (yet 
as in some way empowered by deity), rather than 
the external object, is really the primary agent. 

Berkeley, moreover, saw that this subject mind, 
through its own rational, native powers, fuses or 
combines the external object seen by its own ration- 
ality into a new unity. He did not quite bring out, 
as Kant did afterwards, that the mind does this 
because of its own active, ontological, causal nature 
as mind, but his suggestion was the fertilizing 
element in Kant's later view. Berkeley further 
contended that it is the mind itself, also, that casts 
these external objects into forms called spatial or 
" extended." He certainly 'at least implied by 
these reasonings that the rational mind of man is 
akin to the supremely real, divine, and eternal 
mind: "Thou has set eternity in their heart." 
(Eccl. 3 : II.) 

Berkeley erred, however, — egregiously erred, — in 
conceiving our ideas as arbitrarily imposed upon 
us by the Creator in a dramatic way. The truth 
rather is that these experiences of knowledge 
grasped in our ideas are something previously 
rooted in the very nature of the Creator, but 
rewritten in our nature as homogeneous with 
God's own. The world manifested in us is the 
world which God himself experiences as his own 
blessed activity and joy, and as intended to be 
linked with and enjoyed by our mundane thought 



The Solving of the World-Riddle 21 

and activity. It is the modern discernment of 
this that has led to the new and strong emphasis 
on the immanence of God. This, indeed, is not 
the whole truth, for God is also transcendent over 
his universe and above it as well as immanent in it. 
Berkeley was right in holding to the molding 
energy of rational human life in an experience of 
knowledge; but he failed to see that our human 
idealizing energy, while integrally connected with 
God's own, other than dramatically, is yet depend- 
ent on the deeper reality in him. He did see that 
there is a constitutional relatedness of man's mind 
to the creative mind, in whom " all things con- 
sist," or cohere. 

Berkeley was in error also at one other crucial 
point, namely this: he denied, as the Christian 
Scientists of our own day also do, the reality in any 
sense not illusory of world-objects that lie outside 
the human mind. 

By a truer idealism it is now held that the external 
object, as well as the subject mind, is also a factor 
in an experience of knowledge. It is that to which 
the knowing subject mind has reference as objec- 
tive to itself in knowing anything outside of the 
mind itself. If idealism really ends where Berkeley 
left it, it becomes an impossible philosophy. 

The fundamental reality Berkeley did not really 
and clearly bring out, but respecting which he 
pointed the way, was this idealizing being of God 
as the world-ground of which the idealizing mind 
of man, relative though it be, is yet of the same 
species with God's own and dependent on it. 

This Creator has written the realities of the uni- 



22 The Solving of the World-Riddle 

verse in our very constitution. We know these 
but in part, yet we know them as they are in their 
basal reality, through faculties that are rationally 
trustworthy, as far as they reach. Man is thus 
intended to be constitutionally not a skeptic, but 
a believer. This was a result of immense worth as 
a basis for theism. Berkeley thus led the way to 
a profound opposition to any even quasi-reasoned 
agnosticism, and theistic thought ever since has 
been greatly indebted to him. 




MONUMENT TO KANT IN KONIGSBERG 



IV 

IMMANUEL KANT'S IDEALISM 

Another type of idealism was born a century 
later in the great work of Immanuel Kant, who 
revised and improved upon Berkeley. 

From Spinoza to Kant the great question was, 
" Has man as rational any ideas necessarily true 
or trustworthy? " Many thinkers said, " No." 
Locke contended that we have only sensations. 
Hume went even further and denied that we have 
any valid knowledge from any source. He thus 
argued for a universal skepticism. These discus- 
sions in Great Britain woke up Kant in Konigsberg, 
Germany, leading him to a period of twelve years 
of intense reflection, out of which came two epoch- 
making works, The Critique of Pure Reason and 
The Critique of the Practical Reason. Both works 
were cast into final form in five months. 

Kant held in opposition to the sense-metaphys- 
ics, and in the main with Berkeley, that the subject 
mind, instead of being passive, is active, and organi- 
cally constitutive of things as known. He opposed 
Locke, insisting that we have innate, a priori ideas, 
independent of sensation. He opposed Hume, 
contending that we have ideas necessary and 
universal, something more than mere habit. Against 
Hume's contention that the understanding is 
treacherous, Kant replied, "It is not naturally 
treacherous, but limited." 

Thus far Kant was on solid ground, holding that 

23 



24 The Solving of the World-Riddle 

the mind as rational is active, and, if so, of course 
free; that it always contributes something to the 
object cognized; that the object as really known 
is the result of a union of the mind and the object 
external to it. This product is " phenomenal 
knowledge " as distinguished from that absolute 
knowledge which God has. Thus far Kant was 
constructive, and it was this positive position that 
chiefly made him " the father of modern philos- 
ophy." Had he continued to hold consistently 
to this, his contribution would have been whole- 
some and of vast worth. His doctrine of " phe- 
nomenal knowledge," however, was in error at a 
critical point. He held that by " phenomenal 
knowledge " we are to understand mere phantoms 
or illusions, which mask backlying realities. These 
he called " noumena" or certain imaginary realities 
that can never be known " as they are in them- 
selves." Now, had he meant that we know things 
as " phenomenal ' in the sense that they are real 
for finite knowledge only, his dictum would have 
stood. The cause of his error here was his mis- 
taken interpretation of those formal, but immanent, 
and commonly unconscious, laws of thought native 
to the mind, called "categories," always employed, 
though unconsciously, in a rational knowing act. 

Let me illustrate the meaning of a category, a 
somewhat obscure matter. When a mother divides 
an apple between her children there is implied a 
relation in quantity of a part to the whole; the 
quantity relation is the category involved in the 
mother's understanding of her dividing act. When 
a host at a Thanksgiving dinner having carved the 



The Solving of the World- Riddle 25 

bird inquires of his guest " light or dark meat," the 
category of quality is implied in the consciousness 
of both host and guest. When one arrives at a 
train early or late to meet an engagement the 
implied time relation is the category that bears on 
the comfort or discomfort of his experience. It is 
this rather subconscious matter of relationships 
peculiar to normal mentality that is involved in 
the category. This definition, therefore, is deduced : 
A category is an immanent mental principle 
implied in one's definite, concrete experience, as 
the principle affects the understanding. Category, 
though unobserved, enters in whenever one fixes, 
defines, or rationally relates any object of thought to 
the mind. The categories are all implied in their 
totality from the start in the very idea of ration- 
ality but are never to be thought of as in use except 
in a particular, concrete mental action. Without 
them there is only abstractness or imbecility. 
But Kant went astray here at two points: First, 
He so misconceived the nature of the category 
or formal law of thought as to mistake its essential 
function. It is true that a mental act of knowledge 
always implies every rational category as resident 
in the self-conscious mind which has the experience. 
The mind as " active " in Kant's notion of it, in 
order to contribute anything to an experience of 
knowledge, unconsciously carries with it all the 
categories employed in mental operation; the true 
rational ego, in order to be an ego, implies this. 
Kant, however, slipped into the error of conceiving 
the categories as having an existence as real and 
independent as the ego itself. 



26 The Solving of the World-Riddle 

But this is not true; the category is implicit in 
the ego — never independent of it, much less exter- 
nal to it. 

Kant at this point virtually decomposed his ego, 
on the one hand, and set up an imaginary dominance 
over it on the other. A category has no existence 
as a function for thought apart from a definite, 
concrete act of the intelligence which employs it; 
the moment a category is conceived as outside the 
ego, as independent of it, it is a mere abstraction 
and becomes nothing as affecting mentality. 

The categories never use the intellect, or the 
ego, nor can the ego be understood through the 
categories. On the other hand, the categories are 
understood, and thus only, through a concrete 
living experience of the intellect in its entirety, 
This intelligence is not subject to any laws outside 
itself or beyond itself. It simply " accepts itself," 
by an act of consciousness, as " its own and only 
standard." This true self with its implied cate- 
gories — this free, active intelligence — is the only 
thing within us wherewith to understand anything 
whatever. 

Hence, when Kant implied that these categories 
could of themselves as independent entities return 
upon the ego so as to become agents of illusioning 
the mind, and thus to distort the validity of its 
action, he was in absolute error. He made the 
abstract category (something merely so imagined) 
more determinative for an act of intelligence than 
the ego itself in its integrity. He " split the mind," 
nullified the ego, and thus lost his Archimedean 
point as basis for any kind of knowledge. So 



The Solving of the World-Riddle 27 

non-Kantian a philosopher and idealist as Eucken 
retains as starting point in his system for thought 
what he terms " the independent spiritual life," 
something immanent in man, transcendent in God, 
with cosmic and eternal relations; and he never 
falls into Kant's emasculation of the self thus 
conceived. Eucken, like Bowne, thus conserves 
his ego. 

Then, secondly, when Kant conceived of this 
mind as active, with its implicit laws of thought 
passing over to unite with an external object in 
order to know that object, he wrongly inferred that 
the influence of the element of sense-impression 
(which is united with the mind in an experience of 
knowledge) so further acted on the ego as to derange 
that experience, despite all that was supposed to 
be resident in the ego. Thus resulted Kant's 
famous doctrine of " The Relativity of Human 
Knowledge" — a knowledge in nowise reliable. 
Kant's practical error was in supposing that these 
categories as abstractions so distorted the mind 
itself as compelled it to misunderstand. Having 
first lost his ego, and, secondly, the validity of his 
composite experience obtained by the union of the 
outward sense-impression with that ego, Kant could 
never thereafter, through any amount of reasoning 
backward from his conception of a category, find 
ground for the validity of his knowledge of any 
reality whatever, as "it is in itself." Kant thus 
logically fell back into Hume's skepticism. 

He strove, indeed, to make good his defect for 
morals in another way. He wrote his Practical 
Reason, and found in the realm of man's moral 



28 The Solving of the World-Riddle 

nature the sense of duty, his "categorical impera- 
tive." But he reached this result wholly at the loss 
of the capacity of his previously assumed knowing 
subject. 

Accordingly, despite Kant's original and great 
service in showing that the mind is active, free, 
and constitutive, he unfortunately furnished ground 
for the philosophical agnosticism of the last century. 
Building on his error also, the prevalent Subjective 
Idealism through Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel 
arose, and it has lain at the root of much of the 
widespread and destructive skepticism of Germany. 
And this has mischievously affected much religious 
thought. Ritschl in large part built on Kant's 
agnostic foundation, and in so far implied a false 
metaphysic although disclaiming metaphysics alto- 
gether. It resulted in the committal of rational 
hara-kiri. 




PROFESSOR BORDEN PARKER BOWNE 



THE LATER OBJECTIVE IDEALISM 

Within a century, particularly since the period of 
Lotze in Gottingen, many revisions of Kant have 
been made and published — more than two hun- 
dred in Germany alone. A more defensible type 
of idealism has come in. Some essential elements 
of the Scottish Realism have been preserved, with 
a deeper insight into causal reality, while the pri- 
macy of the soul's active inner life has more and 
more grown on the reflective mind. The extreme 
positions of Berkeley have been displaced, and the 
destructive negations of Kant have been left 
behind. It is now seen that any tenable idealism 
rests not upon the mere act of perception, as Kant 
supposed, but upon an analysis of the product of 
perception. 

This involves, as Bowne saw, an interpretation 
of the significance of those " laws of formal 
thought" — the so-called "categories" described 
in the previous chapter. Kant here was, as Bowne 
says, " on right lines, but he did not think through, 
to a sound conclusion." Most of our objective 
knowledge is explained knowledge, is an interpre- 
tation. 

In our time leading interpreters put the main 
emphasis on personality. Indeed, this now is the 
central word in philosophy. It characterizes the 
writings of the following among many others: 
Professor Ward and the late Dr. Martineau, of 

29 



30 The Solving of the World-Riddle 

England; Professors Ladd and Sneath, of Yale; 
Professor Wenley, of Michigan; Professors Howi- 
son and Buckham, of California; Professor Watson, 
of Canada; Dr. A. H. Strong, of Rochester; Pro- 
fessor Snowden, of Allegany; Professor Palmer, 
of Harvard. Doubtless Professors Royce and Wil- 
liam James, and even Von Miinsterberg might also 
be claimed. But among the foremost stand the 
late Professor Borden P. Bowne, of Boston Uni- 
versity, and Professor Eucken, of Jena, who are 
peculiarly en rapport with each other's thought, 
although Eucken's theological positions, as indi- 
cated by some of his later religious presentations, 
are to my mind sadly astray. 

The positions of Objective Idealism include the 
following principles: 

1. The integrity of the self-conscious ego, as the 
starting point in all thinking on any subject, even 
physical science, needing no proof and susceptible of 
none. The mind is not atomic. Thought is an 
organic activity, and not something put together 
mechanically from without. It builds up its own 
world of knowledge. Bowne calls his system Per- 
sonalism; Eucken calls his, Activism. 

2. The school maintains with Kant that the 
mind as rational always contributes something to the 
object cognized in an experience of knowledge. 
The thing really known in such an experience 
Bowne calls " a reconstruct," because it is a com- 
posite product of the subject mind and the object 
contemplated. Yet the knowing mind is primary. 

3. This view recognizes, as Berkeley did not, 
the independence of the external object, viewed as 



The Solving of the World-Riddle 31 

apart from the human mind, but not independent 
of the Creator's mind which founded all. Yet our 
minds though finite are correlative to God's mind 
and normally reflect it. 

4. Bowne undertakes to fix the concrete signifi- 
cance of the formal laws of mind, the " categories " 
as concretely employed. And here he parts com- 
pany with Kant. Bowne agrees with Kant's 
primal position that the " categories " (or the 
implicit formal relations to experience in all active 
rationality) are first immanent in the self-conscious 
ego. But he holds, as Kant does not, that the 
categories as mere abstractions have no existence; 
and that when this ego passes over to an experience 
of knowledge of the external world, there is no 
mutilation of the knowledge. This act of mind 
always has a real, though limited, value for finite 
intelligence. To that extent phenomenal knowl- 
edge mediates the so-called noumenal, and in so far 
one knows "the thing" — that something pre- 
supposed, by Kant, — even though it were among 
the noumena " as it is in itself." 

5. The so-called noumena are purely mythical. 
If anything appears it must appear to somebody, 
that is, to a personality in whom the formal laws 
of thought immanently abide. 

6. This •' phenomenal knowledge," while always 
relative to finite beings, is yet reliable and depend- 
able knowledge as far as it goes. 

7. Our entire universe with its laws is consist- 
ently conceived when it assumes that there is an 
infinite Creator's thought and will at bottom, and 
all real being and causal energy are rooted in him. 



32 The Solving of the World-Riddle 

Moreover, our rational natures are so homogeneously 
related to this absolute Being that our rationality 
posits God. We are at our best in knowledge when 
we think over again after him the thoughts of God. 
To this extent we really know God and his universe, 
both in things temporal and eternal. 

8. All attempts to explain the universe on the 
impersonal plane are futile. 

9. While this view accepts the verdict of Kant's 
Practical Reason, it reaches its conclusion in a 
different way. The testimony of reason, embracing 
the whole man — mental, affectional, moral, and 
volitional — concerning itself, is accepted. Eucken 
says this is " necessary for our own self-preserva- 
tion." Then there is no ground left for any neces- 
sary skepticism of such a reason. The " faithful 
Creator " has wrought a truth and not a lie into 
our rational constitution. 

10. In the attempt of the finite mind, with all 
its constitutive activity, to grasp the truth, this 
truth often takes on the antithetic form, as in the 
paradoxes of Christianity. This is because the 
deepest insights of reason are realities too deep for 
even our highest powers of natural, fallen ration- 
ality. These insights are obtained only by living 
the truths and principles involved. Then it is that 
the Holy Spirit of God takes up our case, and 
discovers to us the deeper divine secrets, and we 
" know," in the profound Biblical sense, things 
that are " hidden," as even Harnack says, " from 
the profane."* Both aspects of apparent contra- 

* Matthew 16 : 17. See also 3 John, in which the phrase " we know," 
in this sense of knowledge, repeatedly occurs. 



The Solving of the World-Riddle 33 

diction are thus shown to be true through the expe- 
rience of " the willing-hearted"; and this kind 
of demonstration is ever growing. 

11. The deep speculative significance for freedom 
is thus maintained — a freedom consistent also with 
divine sovereignty. We are saved, as one has 
said, " from a self -centered individualism into a 
God-centered personality." It is the unique dis- 
tinction of personality in the ordinary sense, that 
it is able to think twice, to balance matters as a pair 
of scales never do, even to reverse a position, to 
institute a new initiative, and even use the so-called 
" fixities of nature " to reach a personal end, 
which no amount of mere law of itself could ever 
reach. An aviator does this, when he adapts his 
mechanical contrivance to gravitation in such a 
way as to produce its apparent opposite levitation. 
Personality thus transcends, rather than violates, 
mechanism. This in principle occurs in all miracle; 
and thereby disappears the most common objection 
to it. 

Thus this form of Objective Idealism, rejecting 
the old sense- metaphysics, presents personality, 
as actively building up its own world of knowledge. 

Moreover, the supposed foundation for philo- 
sophical agnosticism laid in Kant's unknowable 
" noumena " is swept aside. Man is created with 
a proper self-conscious self, — something which 
cannot be derived from the merely natural or animal, 
something above the culminating point of natural 
evolution (whatever it is), something belonging 
to the eternal, native to it; something which extends 
beyond the individual to the universal whole of 



34 The Solving of the World-Riddle 

things — yet not pantheistic — "a whole grounded 
in God, from whom it draws its credentials and 
power." This life has a timeless depth in it; our 
personal life-process is centered in it, and on that 
ground it postulates the whole cosmic order. 




PRESIDENT EMERITUS AUGUSTUS H. STRONG, ROCHESTER 



VI 

GROUNDS FOR GOD'S BEING, AND OUR KNOWLEDGE 

OF HIM 

But all this later Idealism described in the pre- 
vious chapter is harmonious with — nay, presupposes 
— Deity. The primary theistic suggestion posits 
hypothetically that there is a Supreme Intellect 
behind the whole phenomenal system; that he 
manifests himself through it and ideally founds 
that objective unity of the system with which all 
our finite knowledge is congruous. This hypothe- 
sis has in it fewer difficulties than any other, and 
there is no a priori reason against it. The world 
originated in thought, and it expresses thought 
that is adapted to our thought; i. e., God and his 
thought-universe are such objects as admit of 
rational construction; and so God and his thinking 
creature, man, are homogeneous with each other. 
In other words, rational thought implies the being 
of a personal God, and it is he who has put mean- 
ings for us into the whole phenomenal order. As we 
read a hieroglyph inscribed on a monument, find 
that we have the key also in ourselves, and dis- 
cover a fixed meaning in it, so we perceive a cor- 
respondence between God and our phenomenal 
knowledge of him. We recognize that we belong 
to a thought-system, and a purposeful system, 
requiring a Deity as the founder of that system. 
Even David Strauss confessed that " the idea of 
God has its essential or potential ground in the 

35 



36 The Solving of the World-Riddle 

very constitution of the human mind, as native 
to it, but that this is brought out to consciousness 
by outward perceptions and experiences." The 
idea of God in our mind ipso facto involves its 
presumptive reality. Jacobi has said that " as 
man, in thinking God, anthropo-morphizes, i. e., 
thinks of God in terms of man, so God in creating 
man /^eo-morphizes, i. e., impresses the sense of his 
being upon the thought of man. 

" So nigh is grandeur to our dust, 
So near is God to man, 
When Duty whispers low, ' Thou must,' 
The youth replies, ■ I can.' " 

A soul probably cannot be conscious of itself 
without being aware of some deep relation to an 
absolute Being, its originating Author. Says Presi- 
dent Schurman: "The intuition of God is the 
logical prius of the consciousness of God and the 
world." A rational soul as it comes to full self- 
consciousness posits God, assumes God. It leaps 
as by a flash to the original cause. Hence it may 
be believed as many assert that a child does not need 
to be taught that there is a God, although it needs 
to be taught much about him. But the fact of 
another spiritual Being above him, accounting for 
him, and to whom he aspires, is native to all normal 
souls and even to the feeble-minded. It is said 
that, when Helen Keller was given her first formal 
lesson concerning God, she exclaimed, " Oh, I 
have always known him, but I never knew his 
name until now." " Thou, O God, hast made us 
for thyself." For this we are prepared by the very 



The Solving of the World-Riddle 37 

intuitions of our personal selves. The ever-growing 
knowledge we acquire and exercise presupposes a 
Deity at the other end of the line. 

When a wireless operator at sea communicates 
his thought to a distant ship or station, he does not, 
strictly speaking, " send " the message as one sends 
a letter by mail. He rather plays his part in the 
use of a correspondence which has previously been 
set up between his mind and another mind at a 
distance. In advance, it has been determined that 
certain waves of ether set vibrating in reasoned 
forms by the instrument of the " transmitter " 
shall be caught up through another instrument or 
11 receiver " in the hands of a second party in such 
forms that their meanings can be read. Thus " deep 
calleth unto deep," because the two deeps are there. 
So the deep of man's intelligence corresponds to 
the deep of the divine reason, as realities mutually 
related to each other, and intended for each other. 
When the daisy lifts its head sunward it is because 
the sun is there. " An infant crying in the night " 
implies the day and the mother's care. Here, then, 
is the deep basis for the fundamental teaching that 
religion presumes upon, and is built upon, — interac- 
tion between persons. 

Professor Henry Devaux, an eminent teacher 
of natural science in Bordeaux University, France, 
spent an evening with me in Morges, Switzerland, 
a year or so since, giving me the story of his 
conversion, which occurred on a visit to Northfield 
about twenty-four years ago. Devaux, trained to 
processes of natural science, had long sought in the 
impersonal universe for evidence of God and immor- 



38 The Solving of the World-Riddle 

tality, and especially since the death of his Christian 
father, to whom the thought of non-immortality 
was intolerable. It was at the end of the long 
search of the intellect and even of the exercise of 
conscience that he realized that he had to give 
himself by a deliberate act of will — in other words, 
to commit his entire being — to the hypothetical 
person of the Christ of the New Testament, if he 
was to find God experientially. Then it was that 
the light broke upon him, a light that has shone 
more and more as during the period since he has 
given himself throughout France to lecturing on the 
realms of science and religion, as parallel to each 
other, but in no real conflict. 

One remarkable phenomenon in connection with 
the disclosure of Christ to Devaux was that he 
was instantly assured that his deceased father was 
alive, and he should again see him. Thus in his 
own soul " life and immortality were in one and 
the same moment both brought to light." 

The story of the return to faith of Professor G. J. 
Romanes, the English scientist — largely influenced 
by Dr. John T. Gulick, of Honolulu, — is to the 
same effect. When after long acquaintance and 
sympathetic work in the realm of the sciences, the 
one from the naturalistic point of view and the 
other from the theistic, Romanes finally wrote to 
Gulick asking how, while attaining to such emi- 
nence as a scientist, he and others like Lord Kelvin, 
Clerk Maxwell, and Professor Tait had retained 
their Christian faith, Gulick replied, " The fact is, 
Romanes, you are on the wrong trail" You have 
been seeking for God through the application of 



The Solving of the World-Riddle 39 

physical and material tests, but God is not thus 
found. Religion is the response of a person to a 
person, as a mother and her child mutually know 
each other. Christ himself and what he can prove 
himself to be to the human soul is the final evidence 
of Christianity. 

Romanes then gave up his bootless attempt to 
find God in the realm of physics, and following the 
"higher trail" of personal relations — in its realm 
just as scientific as the other — returned to the 
Christ he had earlier known, and left on record a 
hearty testimony to the realities of the Christian 
experience.* He confessed that he had discovered 
that " logical processes " were " not the only means 
of research in regions transcendental," and he began 
to speak of a " new and short way with the agnos- 
tics." 

Any naturalistic theory, therefore, which strikes 
at the organic, intuitive personality of man, which 
subordinates its significance as primary, or which 
represses moral interaction with God as posited, 
in so far banishes God from his universe; it also 
vitiates the validity of one's own knowing powers. 
The loss of this individual and corporate God- 
consciousness within the past generation is mainly 
due to naturalistic influences from false material 
philosophies, irrelevant or false to the experimental 
matter at stake. 



* See his Thoughts on Religion. 



VII 

CONCLUSION 

Of the two methods of solution now consid- 
ered, the naturalistic and the idealistic, the former 
is no solution whatever. It leaves the universe 
where Haeckel leaves it, — an insoluble riddle. The 
latter presents at least fewer difficulties to rational 
thought; and it leaves us with a minimum of 
difficulties and a working hypothesis: that there is 
a light in which, if we walk, it will " shine more and 
more unto the perfect day." This brings us straight 
to practical religion, something eternal as well as 
temporal. Professor James has said, at the con- 
clusion of his Varieties of Religious Experience: 
" The visible world is part of a more spiritual 
universe, from which it draws its chief significance/' 
and that " union or harmonious relation with that 
higher universe is our true end." 

Through union with this realm we are expected, 
aided by a higher superhuman power, to combat 
and overcome also all evils of the moral realm 
which threaten us. Thus a sound Idealism is our 
best basis — nay, our only one — intellectually speak- 
ing, for both the existence of God and the validity 
of our knowledge of him. It implies that our mind 
below answers to the divine mind above, and vice 
versa. These are two indivisible counterparts in one 
rational universe. If the Bible assumes all this, 
it is because it was first written in the constitution 
of man and the universe, a writing which the Book 

41 



42 The Solving of the World-Riddle 

echoes and which our growing experience ever 
re-echoes. Our world, because primarily a 
" thought-product," is a theistic world, and intended 
for our growing apprehension, holiness, service, and 
joy. 

Moreover, many related truths, like freedom, the 
probability and nature of revelation, the legitimacy 
of the miraculous in a highly purposeful universe, 
and of the supernatural — even of the supernatural 
as the " higher natural," never any violation of the 
real sanctities of law, but rather a transcendence of 
law, if it be conceived as impersonal — and any true 
doctrine of prayer, — all these and many other truths 
are bound up with such a theism as we have endeav- 
ored to set forth. If we are to think at all, and 
especially with Him who said, " Come now, and let 
us reason together," let us think sanely, rationally, 
on all these things. For we must choose, as between 
what Bergson has called the " mechanization of 
mind " (now so manifest in the materialistic 
adaptations of science to the creation of engines of 
destruction) on the one side, the " force spread 
over the surface, which cannot repair itself, which 
exhausts itself," and on the other side " the spirit- 
ualization of matter," "life, power of creation, which 
makes and remakes itself at each instant, because 
it springs from deep roots," representative of 
civilization's higher order. Particularly, then, in 
view of the world-wide confusions and alienations 
threatening everything foundational, it seems in- 
dispensable that all Christian teachers and preachers 
should qualify as never before, to safeguard the un- 
wary, in our families and schools, against becom- 



The Solving of the World-Riddle 43 

ing enmeshed in the agnostic naturalism of the 
time. And in our methods of education it will 
make all difference whether we start our doctrine 
of world-building with molecules of matter or with 

the SELF-CONSCIOUS SOUL. 






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Cook, Joseph. Monday Lectures, Biology, Evolution, etc. 

Eucken, Rudolf. Problem of Human Life. Life's Basis and Life's 
Ideal. Christianity and the New Idealism. Knowledge and 
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Fiske, John. Through Nature to God. Idea of God as Affected 
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Flint, Robert. Theism. Anti-theistic Theories. 

Gibson, W. R. Boyce. Rudolf Eucken's Philosophy of Life. 

Harris, Samuel. Philosophical Basis of Theism. 

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Howison, George Holmes. The Limits of Evolution. 

James, William. Varieties of Religious Experience. The Will to 

Believe. Elements of Psychology. 
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Paulsen, Fried rich. Immanuel Kant: His Life and Doctrine. 

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46 The Solving of the World-Riddle 

Romanes, George John. Thoughts on Religion. Life and Letters, 

by his wife. 
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